

Election Process Protection: Location Specific Custom Study, Registration, Voting Tallying, and Recommendations

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Election Process Protection: Location Specific Custom Study, Registration, Voting Tallying, and Recommendations: Executive Summary

The study is designed to give a comprehensive overview of the Election Process Protection: Location Specific Custom Study, Registration, Voting Tallying, and Recommendations market segment. Research represents a selection from the mountains of data available of the most relevant and cogent market materials, with selections made by the most senior analysts. Commentary on every aspect of the market from independent analysts creates an independent perspective in the evaluation of the market. In this manner the study presents a comprehensive overview of what is going on in this market, assisting managers with designing market strategies likely to succeed. The study is dependent on working with the voting district that purchases the study to create a custom document reflecting the actual process in place. The accompanying book is a prelude to the study.

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The study itself is a custom look at any particular election district with commentary on particular vulnerabilities and recommendations for improvement. This includes recommendations for improvement in the election code

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“To put this to bed with piece of mind we need to count the votes,” said Stein.

Bruce Schneier, a voting expert at the Kennedy School and adjunct lecturer says a recount would not address the possibility of tampering with electronic voting machines. 1

“There are some weirdness’s in the vote tallies that could be explained by any number of things and election machine hacking is one of them,” Schneier said. “We need to do forensic analysis of the machines and look at the various internet trails, this is a lot of work and it’s unclear to me if a recount includes this.”

Hacking Individual U.S. Voting Machines

Problem Statement

A System Is Only As Good As Its Weakest Link

“Threat of Outside Intervention in the US Election Process / Could Russian Hackers Spoil Election Day?”

How To Make Fraud Detectable

Hacking Solution: Need for Emergency Voting Machine Law

Statement of The Problem: Intensity of the Campaign

The Possibility Of A Close Election That Is Decided By Fraud

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Donald Trump

Do We Trust Donald Trump?

Vulnerabilities Of The Vote Counting System

Hillary Clinton

All Elections Are Local

Suggestions to Fix the Vote Counting Election Process Hacking Problem
in the Near Term

Hillary or Donald

Teamsters Story

Securing Against Hacks from Russia

We Are A Country Of Laws

The Nature Of Software

The Value of Software

Certain Protections Need To Be Put In Place Now

Types of Hack Attacks

Paper Audit Trail Provides Security for Election Vote Counting

Electronic Voting Machine Certification Systems

Paper Ballot Audit Trail

Jurisdictions Can Print A Paper Ballot

Voting Machine Cyberattack Counter Attack

Ballot Configuration

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Down Loading Ballot Images Vulnerability

To Those Who Say There Is Not Enough Time

Requiring a Paper Ballot Audit Trail

Conclusion

Susan Eustis: My Credentials

Review by Roy Saltman previously with the voting team at NIST.

According to Roy:

"Susan Eustis has many years of experience working with the design, sale, and use of voting equipment. In this book, she proposes that the process of vote-tallying employ voter-verified paper audit trails for assurance of correct results. Readers should assure that their local election administrators heed her advice."

Roy G. Saltman is a computer scientist, National Institute of Standards and Technology (retired). He is author of "The History and Politics of Voting Technology," Palgrave Macmillan,. 2006.

Democracy Consultant commentary by

John Livingstone, MD. FRSH (UK)

Assistant Professor in Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School.

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